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"Security" in Kyrgyzstan 
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Abstract 
 
 
The Copenhagen School's notion of securitization is widely recognised as an important 
theoretical innovation in the conceptualisation of security, not least for its potential for 
including a range of actors and spatial scales beyond the state. However, its empirical utility 
remains more open to question due to a lack of reflexivity regarding local socio-cultural 
contexts, narrow focus on speech and inherently retrospective nature. Drawing on fieldwork 
conducted by the author in Kyrgyzstan between September 2005 and June 2006, this paper will 
examine the implications of these limitations for conducting empirical research on "security" 
logistically and methodologically. Centrally, the question of how “security” can be researched 
in the field will be discussed. Consideration will be given to the researcher’s role in talking 
“security” and how “security” can effectively be located and explicated through the creation of 
ethnomethodological “thick description”. Issues of contingency, multiple voices and power loci, 
and inter-cultural translation will be addressed. The paper will conclude with a consideration 
of how local knowledge can be used to inform our research and help find ways to bridge the 
divide between the field and theory. 
 
 
Introduction: Meanwhile in Kyrgyzstan… 
 
…here [in Kyrgyzstan] everything’s done on paper, 
but in actual fact there is no security/safety.1
 
Kyrgyzstan, the smallest of the five former-Soviet Central Asian republics, has been the 
subject of heightened international attention ever since the events of early 2005, which 
culminated on March 24 with the overthrow of then-president Askar Akaev’s government in the 
so-called “Tulip Revolution”.2 Since then the socio-economic and political situation in this 
mountainous ex-Soviet republic have remained unstable. Social unrest has remained high: 
according to official data, 2006 saw 726 unsanctioned protests, demonstrations and marches, 
whilst estimates put the number of similar events in 2005 at around 2000.3 Certainly, going on 
statistics, the situation looks quite severe, even allowing for the number of protests in 2006 
being a vast improvement on the 2005 figure. This impression is only strengthened by the fact 
that both mass media and analytical coverage of post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan has tended to focus on 
the prevalence of phenomena associated with instability: public demonstrations, assassinations, 
the “criminalisation” of the country, the inability of the government to carry out reforms or 
respond to the demands of the public. After the initially positive reaction in the West, seen in 
the characterisation of the “Tulip Revolution” as a continuation of the “colour revolutions” that 
had occurred in Georgia and Ukraine, enthusiasm rapidly waned as the “revolution” remained 
unfinished. This change of mood was clearly evident in the title of the International Crisis 
Group’s December 2005 report, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State4, and, later in 2006, 
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1 Interview with representatives of youth educational NGO Peremena, Bishkek, 24/11/2005 
2 For a concise overview of events leading up to March 24, 2005, see International Crisis Group (2005a) Kyrgyzstan: 
After the Revolution Asia Report 97, 4 May 2005. 
3 Karimov, Daniyar (2007) “Bolee 700 nesanktsionirovannykh aktsij protesta zafiksirovano v Kyrgyzstana v 2006 
godu” [More than 700 unsanctioned protest actions recorded in Kyrgyzstan in 2006], 24.kg news agency, 08/01/2007. 
http://www.24.kg/community/2007/01/08/20281.html (accessed 13/03/2007) 
4 International Crisis Group (2005b) Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State Asia Report 109, 16 December 2005. 
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Kyrgyzstan’s high ranking in The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2006, which was based 
on data collected between May and December 2005.5  
  
In light of these circumstances, security is inevitably a topic that is often mentioned, be 
in terms of state viability or territorial integrity, high corruption levels or, at the human end of 
the scale, the continuing high levels of poverty6 and poor health indicators.7 But with “security” 
being mentioned so frequently and in so many contexts: how to study this arguably “contest 
concept” in a reasonably meaningful way? What does it actually mean to research “security”? Is 
there a danger that we may in fact contribute to perceptions of insecurity by focusing on 
security?  
  
These questions are especially pertinent for research that attempts to bridge the divide 
between the theoretical and the empirical, as in the case of the fieldwork discussed in this paper. 
Following a brief outline of the theoretical framework that was initially intended to provide a 
guide for fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, the rest of this paper will consider how the field researcher 
can begin to locate “security”. What sources can be used and what must be considered when 
choosing sources and informants? Can the fieldworker, post-fieldwork, responsibly claim to 
simply be reporting what “security” was found, as the Copenhagen School suggests?8 
Discussion will be grounded in the author’s experiences of conducting fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan 
between September 2005 and June 2006 (September 2005 – January 2006 in the capital, 
ishkek, March – June 2006 in the republic’s second city in the south, Osh).9  B  
The penultimate section will focus on the role of interviews, highlighting how 
ambiguities of meaning and context can be used reflexively to inform both the fieldwork 
process and the theoretical framework. This notion of reflexive and abductive fieldwork will 
then be extended with a consideration of how an interpretivist approach to constructing 
“security” could enhance the empirical potential of securitization, despite the epistemeological 
implications. It will be argued that “security” cannot be seen as an objective phenomenon that 
can simply be located and reported; rather, the researcher must situate herself and her research 
within local contexts, showing how her data has been constructed and her role in this process.  
 
The paper concludes by suggesting that local knowledge may provide a way to bridge 
the empirical, methodological and theoretical divides: it is only by focusing on processes and 
their specificities that it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of “security” beyond the 
direct application of theoretical approaches. 
 
“Outside” the Field: In the Virtual Reality of Theory 
 
The problem with reality is that it interferes with my theory10
 
The Copenhagen School’s concepts of securitisation and societal security were chosen 
to provide the theoretical framework for an investigation into interrelationships between various 
community groups and their perceptions of threats and sources of threats to their community 
identities. The original pre-fieldwork rationale for this choice was that in principle the 
Copenhagen School’s framework provides the means to consider referent objects (that which is 
threatened and whose preservation is presented as being worthy of extraneous measures beyond 
the realm of “normal” politics) other than the state, such as the economy, the environment or the 
nation. It is, therefore, theoretically possible to look beyond the state and broaden the security 
agenda to conceptualise threats to non-state-centric referent objects on a variety of levels, from 
                                                 
5 http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php (accessed 20/02/2007). Kyrgyzstan ranked 28th in 2006 
with a score of 90.3 out of a possible 120. In 2005 the Republic ranked 65th, with a score of 80.4 out of a possible 
120.  
6 The State Statistics Committee's most recent figure for the percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line is 44% (2002). See http://www.stat.kg/Rus/Home/MonBedn.html (accessed 15/03/2007). 
7 The most recent (2004) WTO core health indicators for Kyrgyzstan are available at 
http://www3.who.int/whosis/core/core_select_process.cfm?country=kgz&indicators=selected&language=en 
(accessed 20/03/2007). 
8 Eriksson, Johan (1999) “Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts” Cooperation and 
Conflict 34(3): 314-315 
9 Fieldwork was funded by the Economic & Social Research Council as part of award number PTA-030-2003-00646.  
10 Comment from a political scientist during lunch-time conversation, Copenhagen, April 2005. 
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the domestic to the global. This is obviously quite a seductive prospect for the significant 
number of scholars dissatisfied with the narrow focus of “traditional” (i.e. Realist or neo-
Realist) International Relations (IR) and Security Studies on the state; whilst proclamations of 
the state’s demise have undoubtedly been premature, few could dispute that its status as the 
fundamental unit of the world order is still unchallenged in the post-Cold War era of 
glocalisation.  
  
As a way of broadening the focus of security studies to include non-state units, the 
Copenhagen School developed the concept of sectoral security in their 1998 work Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis,11 building on Barry Buzan’s work in the second edition of 
People, States and Fear.12 A system of five security sectors is presented, each with its own 
referent object: two sectors – the military and political – keep the state as their referent object, 
while a third – the economic sector – is also likely to be state-centric. The other two sectors, the 
environmental and societal, move away from the state, having as their referent objects the 
environment and societal identities respectively. The purpose of the sectors is to break down the 
widened security into more manageable sections in order to facilitate analysis, with each sector 
looking at the whole but […] seeing only one dimension”13   “  
The societal sector is arguably the clearest example of the challenge to the state’s 
dominance in IR, with a particular community identity forming the referent object rather than 
the state in some form. The Copenhagen School posits that “in the present world system, the 
most important referent objects in the societal sector are tribes, clans, nations (and nation-like 
ethnic units, which others call minorities), civilizations, religions and race.”14 The Copenhagen 
School recognize that such identities are likely to intersect with “the explicitly political 
organizations concerned with government”, but argue that they are distinct in that “society is 
about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as 
members of a community.”15 It is worth clarifying here that the terms society and societal are 
not used to refer to the population of a state per se, but rather to refer to “communities with 
hich one identifies”.16  w  
Securitization, whereby security is conceptualized as a “speech-act”,17 is then used to 
locate “security” in each sector. The concept hinges on the idea that speaking “security” is an 
act in itself, it is more than just an utterance. The “security” part of the act is taken to signify the 
presence of an existential threat to a referent object, or, more simply, a threat to its continued 
survival. This (real or perceived) existential threat is then used rhetorically to argue for the 
implementation of measures not sanctioned within “normal” politics. In the words of the 
Copenhagen School, securitization “is the move that that takes an issue beyond the established 
rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special sort of politics or as above politics.”18 
Only if this move is accepted – i.e. the proposed measures are approved of by the audience – 
then a securitization has occurred. If the invocation of “security” is not accepted, then it is only 
possible to talk of a “securitizing move”, in which case an issue does not, in the end, count as 
“security”.  
  
On a purely theoretical level these conceptualizations are not unproblematic, as the 
considerable and growing body of literature critiquing different aspects of the Copenhagen 
School testifies to.19 However, attempting an empirical investigation of “security” utilizing the 
                                                 
11 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner 
12 Buzan, Barry (1991) People, States and Fear (second edition) Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf 
13 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde (1998): 8. 
14 Ibid: 123. 
15 Ibid: 119. 
16 Ibid: 120. 
17 Ibid: 26. 
18 Ibid: 23. 
19 McSweeney, Bill (1996) “Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school” Review 
of International Studies 22: 81-93; Idem (1998) “Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: a response to Buzan and 
Wæver” Review of International Studies 24:137-140; Williams, Michael (1998) “Modernity, identity and security: a 
comment on the ‘Copenhagen controversy’” Review of International Studies 24: 435-439; Idem (1998) “Identity and 
the Politics of Security” European Journal of International Relations 4(2): 204-225; Huysmans, Jef  (1998) 
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framework provided by the Copenhagen School has arguably proved even more problematic: 
theoretical concerns about the privileging of the public voice over other forms of expression20, 
the reification of identities21, the inherently retrospective and outcome-orientated nature of 
securitization22 and the role of the analyst23 are made more immediate. Whilst the theory 
requires that events have already taken place and the outcome know, fieldwork requires 
attention to be paid as much to process, recalling Kirkgaard’s axiom that life must understood 
backwards but lived forwards. In the field, strategies to cope with this Kirkgaardian paradox, 
both generally and specifically in relation to the theoretical approach of the research must be 
ound/improvised, as will be discussed.  f  
In the case of my research, even once “out” of the field, it is still necessary to find ways 
to negotiate and mediate between the theoretical and empirical, this time linguistically. 
Virtually all fieldwork was conducted in Russian, but the research is being written up in 
English and uses concepts defined and explained in English. Specifically, and centrally, the 
word “security” presents a problem: whilst English draws a distinction between “security” and 
“safety”, Russian has only one word, bezopasnost, literally meaning “without danger” and 
defined as “not threatened with danger, protected from danger”.24 It often appeared to me that 
people talked more about safety in an immediate physical sense than security in the sense of an 
existential threat. It is often difficult to distinguish between the two at the sub-national level, 
particularly in light of the unstable socio-political situation. Similarly, the societal dimension, 
with its focus on group identities, allows for greater overlap between safety and security than 
would be the case with inanimate, institutional referent objects such as the state, since 
discussion with people will be framed by whichever understanding of bezopasnost is more 
relevant to them, regardless of theoretical criteria. Throughout this paper I have preserved and 
highlighted this ambiguity of meaning in quoted interview excerpts by using the combination 
“security/safety” in quotations, rather than lay claim to “knowing” or correctly interpreting 
what my respondents meant.25 Whilst this deliberate ambiguity may seem unnecessary to some, 
I maintain that it is justified for the purposes of decentring both theory and the researcher and 
helping illustrate how “security” is understood in the fieldwork context. 
 
The Researcher and “Security” 
 
So there are very many different aspects of security/safety, of course 
there is security/safety in the sense of the country, the security/safety 
of an organisation, the security/safety that you and I are sitting here 
and have the opportunity to talk peacefully, that you have the 
opportunity to carry out your research. I simply didn’t know which 
[sort of] security/safety you had in mind (emphasis added – CW).26
 
 Both theoretically and practically, speaking “security” is a value-laden venture. Ole 
Wæver goes so far as to suggest that the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation of security, in 
contrast to the majority of mainstream approaches, has the distinct advantage that it “points to 
the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical 
                                                                                                                                               
“Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe” European 
Journal of International Relations 4(4): 479-505. 
20 Hansen, Lene (2000) “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the 
Copenhagen School” Millennium 29(2): 285-306; Williams, Michael (2003) “Words, Images, Enemies: 
Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly 47: 511-531. 
21 McSweeney, Bill (1996). 
22 Wagnsson, Charlotta (2000) Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO and Chechnya – 
Securitization Theory Reconsidered. Stockholm: Akademitryck AB, Edsbruk; Wilkinson, Claire (2007) “The 
Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 
38(1): 5-25.  
23 Eriksson, Johan (1999) “Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts” Cooperation and 
Conflict 34(3): 311-30; Behnke, Andreas (2000) “The Message or the Messenger? Reflections on the Role of Security 
Experts and the Securitization of Political Issues” Cooperation and Conflict 3(1): 89-105. 
24 Ozhegov, S.I. & N.I. Shvedova (eds) (1997) Tolkovyj slovar russkogo yazyka [Explanatory dictionary of Russian] 
Moscow: Azbukovnik: 41 
25 All interviews were conducted in Russian. All translations are the author’s own.  
26 Interview with Country Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Bishkek, 06/12/2005 
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question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and political activists alike: why do you call 
this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or not doing this?”27 However, 
all too often these questions have not been answered satisfactorily beyond epistemologically-
ased arguments that have little empirical application.  b  
Thus the field researcher is left with a very fundamental question: how to approach 
“security” in the field? The fieldworker no longer has the “advantage” of merely “observing 
how others advocate [security]” to paraphrase Eriksson28: he is now on the ground alongside 
his research subject and faces many of the same issues as his informants as he tries to make 
sense of events going on around him. Contrary to what theory often suggests, events do not 
happen in a stepwise, logical, measured fashion. Rather, they are “messy” – seemingly 
unpredictable, random, spontaneous, and in the field have to be dealt with in unedited, 
complex, multiple form. 
 
 Unfortunately, the final research account, framed by theory, is most often stripped of 
process, of the fieldwork experience. It is a depersonalised, “objective”, step-wise account of 
completed research that is concerned with “facts” that have largely been sterilised – in effect 
decontextualised, simplified, edited for presentation. At best we can expect a formal 
methodological description of the fieldwork, stripped of serendipity, chance and spontaneity. In 
the same manner, too often the application of theory provides no place for the researcher, either 
as Researcher or simply as a person. Yet in the field the researcher is an integral part of her 
research. Her decisions and actions impact on her material, even if only in subtle ways such as 
how people respond to her. Take for example the quotation at the start of this section: “I simply 
didn’t know which [sort of] security/safety you had in mind.” Regardless of my efforts to keep 
the question as neutral and non-personal as possible, my respondent instinctively wished the 
frame his answer to meet my inferred requirements – in this case the requirements of a junior 
Western researcher asking a journalist writing for an international audience about “security”.  
 
 Our respondents implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – write us into our own research; 
their responses are given within the context of what they know or have inferred about us, as 
well as their own personal context. The change in dynamics this can create, with the respondent 
at times holding the dominant position, further draws us into our research data, making us an 
integral part of the material we create and subsequently present. It was an exchange during an 
recorded interview with an ethnic community leader that made me feel my pretence of 
“objectivity” and, perhaps more importantly, impartiality, was decontextualising my research: 
the “security” that we were discussing implicitly through reference to the threat of religious 
terrorism was grounded in our perceptions of each other as much as in my respondent’s 
personal experiences, as the following excerpt shows: 
 
CW [interviewer]: So you have already spoken about extremism, terrorism. How real, 
from your point of view, is the threat of religious extremism or terrorism? States are 
about always talking about it.  
 
Ittipak Representative [respondent]: You know, I’d say once again, if it wasn’t for the 
machinations of the special services, well, we’ll be open, who gave rise to Bin Laden? 
 
CW: I’d say the Americans. 
 
IR: Well, then, you see, it’s politics again. And then evidently something somewhere 
didn't work out, or may be it’s still something, some kind of continuation of that game. 
And today, to say that, supposedly, religious fanatics are ruling, well then, let’s 
acknowledge that these problems have been in the Christian world. Ulster, right, and it 
still is [a problem]. But yet again I understand that they [the problems] have occurred 
where? That means where a certain Catholic minority has been subject to discrimination. 
If this wasn’t the case, then there wouldn’t be these problems. …29
 
My respondent firstly drew me in, turning the tables on me as interviewer by asking me 
a question, forcing me to take a position that one way or another had the potential to affect our 
rapport and therefore what opinions he expressed in the remainder of the interview. Implicitly 
                                                 
27 Wæver, Ole (1999) “Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson” Cooperation and Conflict 34(3): 317. 
28 Op. cit.  
29 Interview with representative of the Uighur Association Ittipak, 19/12/2005. 
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my answer, which in this case corresponded to his perception of events, created a degree of 
shared understanding about the subject being discussed. Secondly, his use of Northern Ireland 
as an example of religious-based conflict further personalised and contextualised our 
conversation. On a basic level it reflected his awareness that he was talking to someone of 
British nationality but, as he had previously established by asking about Bin Laden, who was 
not uncritical of Western foreign policy. It also permitted him to keep control of the 
conversation as he explained his views to me using “safe” examples from a political point of 
view, before moving to talk about the more politically-sensitive topic of China’s labelling 
ighurs as religious extremists.  U  
Reflecting on the transcript of this interview and others, I was struck by the dishonesty 
of using excerpts as evidence of “security” without contextualising how this “security/safety” 
was created. Firstly, there is the ethical matter of how we represent our informants and their 
words. Particularly with people who could be identified and whose position is politically or 
socially sensitive, not making the context of their comments clear would be highly 
irresponsible. This contextualisation does not just extend to using longer excerpts of transcripts 
to situate what is said. It also needs to involve reflection on the interviewer/researcher’s position 
and how this may have affected what has been said. Particularly for groups that feel 
marginalised or discriminated against, talking to a foreign researcher or journalist can be a way 
to be heard, to have a “voice” in some respects. Beyond the basic level of feeling that someone 
is paying attention, appealing to a foreign or international audience is often seen as a potential 
way to get one’s narrative accepted and demands met.  
 
One example of this concerned people involved in long-term protests demanding that 
the government allocate land on the outskirts of Bishkek after the protesters had moved from 
rural areas to Bishkek and seized land.   After several months of fruitless protests both on-site 
and in the city centre outside the main government building, the White House, the protesters 
started including placards in English (see photo below), rather than Kyrgyz and Russian. 
 
 
 
Land protesters outside the White House, Bishkek, 26 October 2005 
 
This would seem to imply that this group of protestors had decided to focus on an 
international audience, most probably in the form of international organisations such as the 
OSCE, UNDP or USAID which all have a presence in the republic, in the hope that they would 
endorse their protest and help elicit a favourable response – usually unsuccessfully. 
 
 Returning to the theoretical framework of securitization in instances such as these 
proved largely unhelpful. After all, given the unstable socio-political state of post-Akaev30 
                                                 
30 I use this term to avoid the more controversial and politically-loaded appellation “post-revolutionary Kyrgyzstan”.  
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Kyrgyzstan, virtually all issues were being framed in existential terms on multiple levels: the 
future existence of the country was being questioned, as was the future of many societal groups, 
including the Kyrgyz themselves, and on the personal level people did not know how they 
would live in the future. Indeed, many people were quick to tell me that there was no security in 
Kyrgyzstan, reflecting the mood of extreme uncertainty in the face of a seemingly endless 
stream of crises that the government often appeared unwilling, or unable, to respond effectively 
to, in spite of occasional and often belated pronouncements to the contrary.  
  
At the same time, there was no shortage of groups demanding immediate solutions to 
their problems regardless of the legality of their demands. Such demands were often expressed 
publicly and loudly through public demonstrations, some times with threats of violence, 
including self-immolation on several occasions. Effectively, “normal” politics – the 
Copenhagen School’s default starting arena for the launching of a securitization – did not exist, 
as could be expected following the overthrow of the president and his apparatus. In effect, there 
was no vertical of power that would act as a filter for securitizing moves by establishing who 
had sufficient social capital to effectively speak “security”. Instead, the situation was one of 
multiple voices struggling to be heard on multiple geographic, social and even political levels. 
Reference to theory here was little use as the framework and even the basic criteria could not 
apture the nuances of the situation. c  
One possible way to “filter” the mass of primary field data that can be observed and 
documented would be to see which narratives are reported by the mass media. This would, in 
principle, provide a benchmark if not for securitizations, then at least for “significant” 
securitising moves, echoing the Copenhagen School’s recognition of the impact such moves can 
have on the broader situation.31 However, this method is not without its problems either, as 
Hans-Henrik Holm notes, pointing out that what makes the front page is determined by local 
cultural, historical and ideological context.32 In this respect the media act as a gatekeeper, with 
their own agendas to pursue and promote. The editor of the independent local newspaper Itogi 
nedeli in Osh was blunt on this matter, noting at his choice of front page was dictated by what 
would sell the most copies. For example, a recent issue uncovering the awarding of incorrect 
degree certificates33 apparently sold very well, whilst “when there is a political theme, there are 
far fewer copies sold.”34 Similarly, IWPR’s Country Director noted that the material published 
reflected the interests of the international audience, explaining that  
 
…we want to tell people what is happening in the world through the voice of simple 
journalists. Usually it happens that some correspondent or other comes from abroad, 
spends two or three days in the Hyatt, files his story and leaves. That is, he’s here for one 
event or another. We try to make sure that local voices are heard on the international 
level, and this predetermines our choice, that is, we want to cover those stories that are 
understandable to an international reader, […] sometimes it might be topics that are 
exotic and interesting for an international reader.35
 
As can be seen, different audiences receive different information, and, particularly in 
the case of “speech acts”, the media effectively filters what narratives get heard. One further 
way the researcher may seek to triangulate her impressions is through the use survey and public 
opinion data. Aside from the problem of direct comparability between data sets, there is also the 
issue of the contingency of results. The magnitude of contingency’s effect should not be 
underestimated, as the following example illustrates. In both Bishkek and Osh I arranged to 
have a social survey about perceptions of identity carried out.36 In addition to questions about 
native language, nationality, religion and aspects of personality, a general question on political 
views was included: “Are you for a democratic society or for strong power (or other)?” As 
                                                 
31 “A better measure of importance is the scale of chain reactions on other securitizations: How big an impact does 
the securitizing move have on wider patterns of relations? A securitizing move can easily upset orders of mutual 
accommodation among units.” Buzan, Barry, Jaap de Wilde & Ole Wæver (1998): 26. 
32 Holm, Hans-Henrik (2002) “Failing Failed States: Who Forgets the Forgotten?” Security Dialogue 33(4): 464. 
33 Jorobekova, Nargiza (2006) “Nenuzhnyj diplom stoit 50 000 somov” [A unnecessary diploma costs 50,000 som] 
Itogi nedeli 15(47) Osh, Kyrgyzstan: 14 April 2006. 
34 Interview with editor of Itogi nedeli, Osh, 05/05/2006. 
35 Interview with Country Director, IWPR, Bishkek, 06/12/2005. 
36 Bishkek survey conducted December 2005, n=291; Osh survey conducted June 2006, n=253. 
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Table One below shows, there was a large difference in the responses from Bishkek and Osh. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of respondents in 
Bishkek (Dec 2005) 
 
% of respondents in 
Osh (June 2006) 
For democratic society 25.4 71.9 
For strong power 48.5 17.8 
For both 19.2 0.8 
Other 5.5 3.6 
No answer 1.4 5.9 
 
             Table One. Responses to the question 
“Are you for a democratic society or for strong power (or other)?” 
 
One might expect some differences between responses in the northern, more secular, 
more Russified capital and the southern city of Osh, with its large Uzbek population37 and 
reputation for being more religious and conservative, but the results seem to be counterintuitive: 
it would seem logical for support for democracy to be higher in Bishkek than in Osh, as the 
former is less traditional, more socially liberal and more open to external influences. However, 
he statistics suggest the opposite is true.  t  
In this case, it is possible to suggest that the timing of the survey had a significant effect 
on the results. In Bishkek on October 28, 2005, there had been a large public rally under the 
slogan “Peaceful Citizens for Kyrgyzstan Without Organised Crime”. This was the culmination 
of a series of protests by competing groups that was sparked by the murder of a parliamentary 
deputy on October 20. The leader of one of the protesting groups was the murdered deputy’s 
brother, the known criminal authority Ryspek Akmatbaev. After several days of protests 
demanding the immediate resignation of the then-Prime Minister, Feliks Kulov, President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev agreed to meet with a delegation from the group protesting against his 
Prime Minister. Understandably, this raised fears amongst the public that the government was 
weak and in danger of becoming criminalised. Given the resonance of this situation, as well as 
evidence that residents of the capital are relatively more aware of crime and concerned about 
instability,38 it is perhaps less surprising that a relatively low proportion of respondents said 
hey were solely in favour of a democratic society.  t  
Similarly, a consideration of the situation in Osh, as well as Kyrgyzstan more widely, in 
June 2006 suggests that the survey data is highly contingent. On a local level protests in Osh 
had been extremely limited in number and size and generally related to local issues such as 
perceived unfair arrests. There was also a general sense of “protest fatigue” even when speaking 
about opposition-led rallies being held in Bishkek, if indeed people were aware of them.39 In the 
same way, nationally the situation had been less tense and there had been fewer protests overall, 
with those that did occur taking place predominantly in the north. Perceptions of instability may 
also have been lower due to different and more limited media coverage of protests in favour of 
more local concerns. In these circumstances democracy is more likely to be seen in positive 
terms, such as a guarantee of being able to practice one’s religion, rather than an ineffective 
orm of government in the face of serious threats.  f  
The researcher is therefore not necessarily any better off in relying on the media or 
statistical data as an indicator of securitizations. Once again, it is a question of slowly building 
up a composite picture using as many sources as possible and taking care to critically evaluate 
                                                 
37 As of 2005, according to official data Uzbeks comprised 31.25% of the population of Osh oblast. (Figures from the 
Osh Dom druzhby, 23 May 2006.) 
38 IRI, Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization Kyrgyzstan National Voters Study April 2005: 11, 14. 
39 Informal interviews, Osh, 26 April 2006. 
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all information and associated assumptions. Broadly speaking, an ethnographic approach is 
likely to be most suitable for this, even if it requires setting aside one’s theoretical framework to 
ensure one does not simply find what the theory suggests should be found. Adopting such an 
approach is not the anathema many theoreticians suggest. Rather, as Bayard de Volo and Schatz 
point out, “The irony is that although political scientists, as students of power and politics, are 
well positioned to consider these links, the discipline tends to ignore them.”40 Similarly, the 
Copenhagen School is not fundamentally opposed to empirical studies; indeed in Buzan and 
Wæver’s most recent book there is explicit recognition of the current lack of empirically-based 
case studies of securitization.41 The question, as  we have seen, is how to conduct such a study.  
 
Talking bezopasnost, Security and/or Safety   
 
     Q: What, in your opinion, does the word bezopasnost mean? 
A: The government has in mind the absence of war with 
neighbouring countries, we have more in mind… all this 
bloodletting, inequality, it’s frightening. There’s such a sense 
of fear now.42
 
In light of the centrality of reflexivity to undertaking a successful empirical study of 
“security”, ambiguities that arise must be particularly closely considered. I was already 
conscious of any “interviewer effect”, or simply of potentially contributing to perceptions of 
insecurity due to my (junior) status as a Western researcher. Widespread distrust of the 
government and authorities has resulted in people expressing a preference for information from 
non-governmental or non-Kyrgyz sources, extending to asking the opinion of visiting 
contractors on issues such as water cleanliness rather than trust published statistics, for 
example.43 It was necessary to be careful, therefore, to ensure as far as possible that I was not 
seen as an expert in any way. In terms of appearance this was largely uncomplicated due to 
being perceived as very young and previously having been known as a student by several key 
contacts.44 When talking to people I generally avoided calling myself a political scientist, which 
is considered quite academically prestigious, preferring to refer to my background in Russian 
language and literature (academically not prestigious), or sometimes calling myself a 
sociologist. Furthermore, during interviews and conversations I described my research in very 
broad terms, stressing that I wanted to hear what people thought and learn. I tended to present 
the issue in a number of ways, usually mentioning the words "society", "perceptions of 
security", "relations with the state", "identity" and "communities", avoiding defining any 
particular sort of “security”, or indeed, “safety”. I feel this approach was warranted in light of 
the value-laden nature of words like "security", but on the other it meant that locating “security” 
became a very context-dependent venture, both in terms of what events had recently happened, 
nd potentially how exactly I framed the question.  a  
To help address this issue I introduced a check question during interviews: “what does 
“security” mean to you? On its own this question would have been wholly inadequate, but 
within the wider context it proved to be very important in picking up nuances, contradictions 
and ensuring I did not leap to conclusions on the basis of limited information. In addition, from 
a theoretical perspective, it further highlighted the need to understand what we – and others – 
mean when we use certain words, since no word is value-neutral and our usage informed by a 
myriad of socio-cultural factors that require explicit interrogation by the fieldworker. 
  
                                                 
40 Bayard de Volo, Lorraine & Edward Schatz (2004) “From the Inside Out: Ethnographic Methods in Political 
Research” PS: Political Science & Politics 37(2): 268. 
41 Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver (2003) Regions and Powers Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 74. 
42 Interview with representative of the Osh branch of the Uzbek National-Cultural Association “Orzu”, Osh, 
05/06/2006 
43 Reported in conversation with a DFID contractor, Bishkek, November 2005. 
44 For a fuller account of positionality issues encountered during the fieldwork, see Wilkinson, Claire (2007) 
‘Positioning “Security” and Securing One’s Position: The Researcher’s Role in Investigating “Security” in 
Kyrgyzstan’ in Wall, Caleb & Peter Mollinga (forthcoming 2007) Fieldwork in Difficult Environments: Discussing 
the Divergence between Theory and Practice Berlin: Lit Verlag.  
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Of all the interviews I conducted in Bishkek and Osh, only members of Kel-Kel, a 
youth organisation that was a high-profile actor in protests leading up to the "Tulip Revolution", 
immediately moved for a definition related to the state rather than considering a number of 
levels first. Answers ranged from a largely abstract consideration of “security”, as in the case of 
the above quotation from IWPR’s Country Director, to very personal accounts, such as that 
given by a member of Labrys, an NGO supporting lesbian, bisexual and male-to-female 
transgendered people: 
 
For me security/safety means when nobody intrudes into my personal life, when nobody 
hurts me, when my rights and beliefs are respected. And security for me is when it is quiet 
on the street, when I can walk around alone at night, when I do not fear meeting my 
husband somewhere around the corner (which I often did). Security/safety is when you just 
know that your day will be calm, free of stress or negative experiences. My husband used 
to beat me up constantly… So when I go to bed without having been told off or beaten up 
or having had my mood spoiled by anyone, I think I have had a safe day. That is, 
security/safety is when nothing threatens you.45
 
Several respondents were keen to stress the absence of security/safety in Kyrgyzstan: 
“Security/safety, it seems, means that there is such a system in the country so that there is 
respect towards individuals and that people are permitted to be themselves, because at the 
moment we don’t have this. So, in this sense, we have no security/safety” reasoned one youth 
activist in Bishkek.46 Another youth activist who also worked as a journalist framed his answer 
with reference to an attack he had recently suffered:  
 
Safety/security isn’t even a topic here now, I’ll just say one thing, everyone, most likely, 
knows, there’s been attacks on deputies, they have openly made threats by telephone, 
openly said to me that if I don’t leave Osh they’ll come and get me. I did a sort of hidden 
interview with them, the border guards come in, even in the open they’re not afraid of me 
and openly beat me badly. That was in Osh not long ago, around the 6th or 7th of 
December. Well then, what sort of talk about security/safety can there be?47   
 
Most frequently, however, interviewees were keen to stress the range of possible 
definitions, often contextualising their answers in considerable detail. For example, the 
president of one local NGO working on conflict prevention and mediation explained how 
definitions of “security” have changed over time, but that currently different actors – in this case 
the Kyrgyzstani government and the NGO sector respectively – are using differing definitions 
of security: 
 
… this is possibly from my experience of work. Now we already have several 
understandings in the region of what SSB is, incidentally thanks to international 
organisations, that earlier by SSB we always had in mind state SSB or regional SSB and 
today we focus on the term human SSB. I think that this understanding [of the term] is 
getting through to a certain elite, to a certain section of the elite. Secondly, who answers 
for it, if earlier, as we said there was such an understanding, a sovkov understanding, as 
state SSB, then the institutes of state were responsible for state SSB. As a rule this is the 
Ministry of Defence, the police, the Committee for National Security, and so on. Today, 
since we’re now talking about human SSB, there is also the notion that not only state 
institutions are responsible for it [i.e. SSB], but that the civil sector should also carry 
responsibility. … Further, since we’re talking again about state SSB, it is borders, one’s 
territory, the territory of the country, maybe it’s natural resources, it’s intelligence officers, 
the CIA and the like as a threat. Today we include in SSB such things as a quality 
education, for example, equal access to resources, ecology has become a very serious 
matter, and, well, quality of life in general. So we’re already changing the component parts 
of the word SSB. Well, and, if earlier when we talked of SSB then, as a rule, we were 
looking as an external enemy as a threat, some form of inter-state war. But today, when we 
talk about SSB, here , undoubtedly, we’re talking about internal political chemistry, put it 
this way, about the interrelationships between the authorities, the opposition and citizens, 
                                                 
45 Interview with member of LBT NGO Labrys, Bishkek, 14/12/2005. 
46 Interview with representatives of Birge! Youth Movement, Bishkek, 23/11/2005. 
47 Interview with representative of KelKel Youth Movement, Bishkek, 22/11/2005. 
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about the presence or absence or weakness or strength of mechanisms of state institutions 
or other institutions that are capable of resolving disputed, conflictual problems.48
 
 The researcher is thus faced with a problem. All of these interviewees were selected as 
representatives of communities who had in the past been able to effectively act as securitizing 
actors (successfully or unsuccessfully), invoking a societal referent object and presenting a 
threat narrative in the public domain (usually via the mass media). Yet, as can be seen, when 
interviewed they often spoke in far more personal terms than solely as a community spokesman. 
The Copenhagen School’s assertion that societal identities can be viewed as largely stable or 
“sedimented”49 is therefore problematic, since the degree of stability does not preclude other 
identities intersecting with them and indeed shaping the societal identity in question. The 
inherent relativity and contingency of identities, both those of the people in the field and our 
own, place the researcher in a unique and often uncomfortable position between the field and 
heory.  t  
Once identity is viewed as  more flexible, multiple and co-constitutive with events, then 
we once again see the importance of contingency in securitization and therefore the necessity to 
consider the relationships between individual securitizing moves, which often operate across 
multiple levels, appeal to multiple audiences and may be in direct conflict. This is especially 
true in Kyrgyzstan, as in other so-called “weak” states, where there are multiple loci of power, 
both official (various levels of government, political opposition, national-cultural organisations, 
the NGO sector) and unofficial (local criminal authorities, sections of the mass media), meaning 
that non-state actors with sufficient social authority have as much “voice”, or even more “voice” 
as state-recognised actors such as politicians. The researcher cannot simply locate “security”, or 
indeed any other phenomenon. Rather, she must build up sufficient description around it so that 
it is made “visible”, in much the same way as an artist may draw an object using negative space. 
The negative space in this case is “security”, which is interpreted in relation to that surrounding 
it, namely the field context and theoretical framework. 
 
Interpreting “Security”: Local Knowledge Between Theory and 
Fieldwork 
 
           CW: What, in your opinion, are the most acute social problems in Osh? 
PG: Oh, but I’m not a sociologist… 
CW: No, but from your perspective as a journalist? 
PG: I won’t take… I’m not going to talk about it, it would be 
unfair, I’m not a researcher or statistician. The last few months 
I’ve just been the manager of the newspaper, I demand that my 
journalists tell me what’s happening. I don’t have any right to 
even talk about it because I just switch on the TV and watch the 
news, I’m just a consumer.50  
 
Ironically, given the lengthy illustrations of the importance of context, positionality and 
reflexivity I have provided so far, much of the clearest explanation comes directly from the 
people being researched. Accessing this “local knowledge” is perhaps the most vital component 
for ensuring our work is fully contextualised and focused on the subject of research, not on the 
researcher. In this sense it is up to the researcher to present this knowledge and use it to both 
contextualise and decentre herself and her research. Consider, for example, the following 
excerpt from an open letter to President Kurmanbek Bakiev on November 30, 2005, by two 
representatives of the NGO sector that was circulated by email: 
 
If the courts worked, and citizens’ problems were solved by competent state 
administration system specialists who were not indifferent, then there would not be any 
need to go out onto picket lines, demonstrations and protests. People decide to do this 
only when all other methods have been exhausted – letters, meetings, dialogues, appeals 
to the mass media. 
 
                                                 
48 Interview with representative of Fund for Tolerance International, Bishkek, 30/11/2007. 
49 Buzan, Barry, Jaap de Wilde & Ole Wæver (1997): 243. 
50 Interview with editor, Itogi nedeli newspaper, Osh, 05/05/2006 
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[…] in any case when people take to the streets and squares, it is vital for the government 
to pay particular attention to the reasons that led to such a step. This will give the 
opportunity to be in the course of all events, and a dynamic solution to the problems will 
facilitate the gradual recovery of society.51
 
This letter concisely elucidates both the context – the failure of state institutions to 
address the needs of the people, the problem – public protests and immediate demands, as well 
how it can best be addressed in the authors’ opinion – understanding how the situation arose and 
keeping abreast of events as they happen. If, therefore, we are seeking to investigate a 
phenomenon that is fundamentally linked to events such as protests, using knowledge from the 
field to inform not only our conclusions but our methods would seem a logical step.  
 
 According to an opinion poll conducted in April 2005, “security” was rated as being the 
most important value to Kyrgyzstani people.52 Yet, as has been explored in this paper, such a 
“fact” is largely meaningless when taken out of its socio-political context. Recourse to 
theoretical frameworks cannot replace the detailed and careful interrogation of the object of 
study within a specific locale, paying attention to local understandings. Moving the local to the 
foreground of study, permits us to focus on specificities, ambiguities and the disjunctures 
between theory, method and the field. For the study of social phenomena, such an approach is 
likely to be far more revealing and nuanced than a focus on commonalities both theoretically 
and empirically, as well as facilitating the bridging of the gap that too-often exists between 
these two integral parts of research. 
                                                 
51 Sasybekova, Asya & Natalya Ablova (2005) “Pismo Prezidentu po povodu mitingov” [“Letter to the President 
about Protests”]. Distributed by email 30 November, 2005. Received by email.  
52 “Security” was given a mean score of 7.48, where 1 – “important to me” and 9 – “most important to me”. IRI, 
Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization Kyrgyzstan National Voters Study April 2005: 45. 
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